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This article explains by what means ongoing democratic backsliding takes place in 
Brazil, after the pinnacle of its democratic experience. Unlike mainstream concerns 
about the death of democracies and the quality of democracy, it started neither 
by the action of outsiders nor through Executive aggrandizement. Institutions 
regarded as protectors against abuse of power, such as media, the judiciary, public 
prosecution, and parliament, led to the disruption of democracy. Consequences were 
militarization, party system deterioration and undemocratic elections, favoring far-
right extremist Bolsonaro.
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RESUMEN
Este artículo explica como ocurre el retroceso democrático en curso en Brasil, 
tras el apogeo de su experiencia democrática. A diferencia de las preocupaciones 
tradicionales acerca de la muerte de las democracias o de su calidad, este retroceso no 
empezó ni por la acción desde fuera ni a través del engrandecimiento del Ejecutivo. 
Instituciones consideradas protectoras contra el autoritarismo, como los medios 
de comunicación, el poder judicial, la fiscalía pública y el parlamento, llevaron 
a la ruptura de la democracia. Las consecuencias fueron la militarización, el 
deterioro del sistema de partidos y las elecciones no democráticas, que favorecieron 
a Bolsonaro.
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Despite not being free of problems, the end of military rule in 1985 led to the 
most stable and deeply democratic age in Brazilian history. Indeed, Brazilian 
hegemonic Political Science used to believe that democratic resiliency in the 
country was safe, as the institutionalization of the party system, free elections 
and Executive-Legislative relations seemed to be far advanced (Figueiredo & 
Limongi, 1999; Palermo, 2000; Limongi, 2006). 
However, the Brazilian case is an example of how democratic backsliding 
may be much faster than the progressive advancement of democracy. We may 
consider that Brazil’s democratization process reached a pinnacle with the ac-
ceptance of electoral defeat by Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Party of Brazi-
lian Social Democracy (PSDB) in 2002 and the alternation of power, followed 
by 13 years in which left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) governed, winning four 
fully democratic elections in a row, with presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma 
Rousseff being elected. The dramatic end of that age leads to a fast democratic 
backsliding, as will be explained in this text.
Brazilian polity is also a useful example to discuss how some usual as-
sumptions in political science may be misleading, as I will do in this article. 
The death of democracy happened in a way that diverges from mainstream 
diagnostics according to Levitsky’s or Runciman’s models (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 
2018; Runciman, 2018). Indeed, some upcoming reasons were already indi-
cated in a previous text of mine with a similar title: “How democracy dies” 
(Reis, 2015). By ignoring some core elements, it is not possible to understand 
Jair Bolsonaro’s phenomenon: he is not a cause of democratic breakdown, but 
rather its consequence and enhancement. Also, as I will discuss later, those 
authors emphasize a pernicious role of outsiders and support barriers as a so-
lution. However, those very barriers may be undemocratic; they are suppor-
ting a specific market-oriented policy and not properly democracy. According 
to Webster’s Dictionary, autopsy (or necropsy) may be defined as “a post-mor-
tem examination to determine the cause of death”. Of course, you may identify 
precisely the defunct. Authors are discussing the death of democracy but loo-
king to a wrong corpse. I will address this problem in “The downfall” section.
The improvements and disruption of Brazilian democracy may be gra-
phically noticed as measured by V-Dem indices for different conceptions of 
democracy (Coppedge et al., 2017): Electoral, Deliberative, Liberal, Partici-
patory, and Egalitarian (Figure 1). There was a sharp improvement in re-de-
mocratization in 1985 and the new Constitution in 1988, a slighter one in the 
election of Lula in 2002, and a dramatic slump since the 2015 economic crisis 
and 2016 coup.
This text aims to make a necropsy on Brazilian democracy, exploring how 
it died. It will be organized this way: in the following section, I will make a brief 
overview of Brazilian undemocratic history and explain why those 13 years 
should be considered the most democratic ever. After that, the analysis will 
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move to the de-democratization process that began when Rousseff was ousted 
from the presidency, divided into three more sections besides the conclusion.
Undemocratic chain
Brazilian history is mostly not a democratic one. Independence from Portugal 
in 1822 was followed by the introduction of an Empire in which the king had 
substantial powers, always having the last word due to what was euphemistica-
lly called the Moderator Power, not being analogous to current parliamentary 
monarchies. The proclamation of the republic in 1889 was a military coup, 
with the introduction of the so-called Sword Republic not leading to more 
civil liberties than the previous regime. Five years later, it was succeeded by 
the Old Republic, in which election frauds were the rule, and most of the time 
rural oligarchies from the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais took turns 
holding the presidency. Besides that, merely 5% of people voted for president 
in that First Republic. That undemocratic electoral regime ceased with the Ge-
túlio Vargas coup, known as the Revolution of 1930, which led to the forging 
of many important institutions, state-owned companies, and social welfare in 
Brazil. In 1937, that dictatorship centralized its power even more, starting the 
so-called New State.
Brazil would know a polyarchic regime (Dahl, 1971) only after the end 
of the New State, in 1945. However, the very first election was disputed by 
military candidates and, only three years afterward, the recently legalized and 
electorally strong Communist Party was made illegal again. Elections were 
not characterized by easy acceptance of the ballot results, and among the most 
Figure 1.  
Indices for different 
conceptions of democracy
Source: V-Dem (Electoral Democracy Index; Deliberative Democracy Index; Liberal 




turbulent events, we may highlight the failed assassination attempt of uncom-
promising opposition leader Carlos Lacerda in August 1954 and the Vargas 
suicide in the very same month, not to mention coup attempts (Santos, 2017).
The left-wing Brazilian Labour Party was growing from election to elec-
tion (Soares, 2001) and indeed had a vice president, João Goulart, who beca-
me president after conservative Jânio Quadros resigned from office. However, 
the Armed Forces only accepted Goulart’s presidency after a change in the 
system of government, from presidential to parliamentary since presidents in 
the latter usually have much less power than in the former. Goulart accepted 
those terms, but the regime returned to presidentialism after the people’s de-
cision in a referendum in 1963. Once more, most of the Armed Forces did not 
tolerate this and a coup d’état in 1964 ousted the president and led to 21 years 
of violent military dictatorship.
Although considered by Alvarez et al. (1996) as democratic, the first presi-
dential election in 1985 was indirect, just like the ones held under dictatorship. 
Additionally, as the winner Tancredo Neves died before the beginning of his 
term, Vice President José Sarney took office. I must also mention that illiterate 
people were not allowed to vote throughout Brazilian republican history until 
the enactment of the 1988 Federal Constitution. The very first free election, in 
1989, with biased participation of the press (Goulart, 2008), was followed in 
1992 by the impeachment of Fernando Collor, accused of corruption.
In any event, stability endured ever since. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
elected in 1994, had a majority coalition and could make neo-liberal state re-
forms with strong parliamentary support (Palermo, 2000). On the one hand, 
the government coalition schemed to change the rules to allow Cardoso to 
be re-elected in 1998 (Rodrigues, 2014). On the other hand, he did accept his 
party’s candidate’s electoral defeat in 2002 and Brazil saw a democratic alter-
nation of power, with left-wing Lula da Silva as the new president.
During their three and a half presidential terms, PT’s governments streng-
thened predictable enforcement. The autonomy of the Federal Police and Pu-
blic Prosecutor’s Office has been considerably increased compared to previous 
governments, which closely controlled investigations themselves. However, 
the public’s perception of corruption increased, due to the media and the Ju-
diciary “criminalization of politics” (Santos, 2017; Marona & Barbosa, 2018; 
Feres Júnior & Sassara, 2018; Veiga et al., 2019), reaching its worst level one 
year before the 2016 coup, according to Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer, and worsening again in 2017 as inducted president 
Michel Temer reversed policies against corruption (see Figure 2).
Other measures taken by the PT strengthened checks on the Executive. 
For the head of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic (and also the 
heads of the federal universities), the president of the Republic could choose 
any candidate from a “triple list” (a list comprised of three names, the first of 
which received the most votes from her or his colleagues); although, different 
from previous officeholders, Lula and Rousseff always chose the first name on 
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the list, the most voted one. In addition to this, Rousseff enacted a law that 
stated that only policemen at the top of their career with the Federal Police 
could be chosen as the Director-General of that bureau. Lula and Rousseff 
could also indicate most of the justices of the Supreme Court but made no 
partisan choice.
Additionally, Lula created or re-created national conferences and councils 
to spread the people’s participation in public policies, such as those for the 
Promotion of Racial Equality, for Women’s Rights, for Fighting Discrimina-
tion, for Disabled People’s Rights, for Elderly People’s Rights, for the Youth, 
and Cities, as well as the National Commission of Indigenous Policy (Pogre-
binschi, 2010).
The downfall
Great waves of massive, heterogeneous popular protests in 2013 (Bringel, 
2013; Reis & Soares, 2017) began a change in the mood of Brazilian politics, 
with less acceptance of the rules of the game, great dissatisfaction with politi-
cal parties, and less control by traditional organized social movements. This 
article will focus, hereafter, on the eight-year period until the beginning of 
2021, in a declining democratic trend.
The media narrative that PT’s corruption broke the Brazilian economy 
(Azevedo, 2017, for example) boosted the anti-PT and anti-politics feelings 
and desire for a political change, be it democratic or not, and without a clear 
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direction, favoring someone not identified with political class (Reis & Soares, 
2017). The bad economic moment also impacted people’s perceptions, and 
GDP growth in Brazil was almost null in 2014 and fell again in 2015, keeping 
the same negative outcome in 2016, as Figure 3 shows. The economic crisis 
was considerably caused by the way corruption investigations in Operation 
Car Wash were held by judge Sérgio Moro and Federal Police, affecting state 
oil company Petrobras, engineering and construction companies, and invest-
ments (Belluzzo, 2018).
Source: Tinoco & Giambiagi (2018, p. 9).
Cardoso’s party PSDB lost the runoff against the PT for the fourth time in 
2014, but its candidate, Aécio Neves, did not accept the result, differently from 
the previous three defeats. The second term of Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousse-
ff, would suffer undemocratic pressures until its premature end (Santos, 2017).
Rousseff ’s impeachment process, distinctly from Collor’s, had no relation 
to corruption. The accusation of manipulating the federal budget dealt with 
measures which happened in previous and subsequent national and local go-
vernments, being neither serious enough (Carvalho, 2018, pp. 105–115) nor 
enough of a felony to be considered what is known in Brazil as a “crime of 
responsibility”, the type of crime necessary for an impeachment to take place. 
Only two days after the impeachment was concluded, the same maneuver of 
which Rousseff was accused was fully legalized in a bill. Indeed, majority op-
position sought an excuse to oust an undesired president (Löwy, 2016; Semer, 
2016; Reis, 2017). It means that elections in Brazil ought not to be considered 
democratic any longer, as they are not decisive (O’Donnell, 1999) and do not 
follow the rule of the ex-post irreversibility (Alvarez et al., 1996).
The impeachment was transformed into a vote of no confidence, like the 
one that exists under parliamentary systems, what is obviously illegal and ig-
nores the popular sovereign decision in a previous direct election for a limited 
and fixed presidential term. Therefore, it has been called a “coupeachment” 
(Klein, 2016) or an institutional, constitutional, or parliamentary coup (Löwy, 
Figure 3. 
GDP Growth in Brazil
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2016; Santos, 2017; Pereira da Silva, 2018). By stretching the rules, the opposi-
tion disrespected core elements of democracy, with the practical consequence 
of making any left-wing government unfeasible. This was made clear by the 
speech of the opposition leader in the lower house, PSDB Congressman Mi-
guel Haddad, during the impeachment process:
Today, we are no longer judging only the nature of the many crimes com-
mitted by President Dilma Rousseff which are shown daily in the newspa-
per headlines. What we are deciding today with our vote in the Chamber of 
Deputies and afterwards in the Senate is the future of a country destroyed 
by a president of the Republic who, with arrogance, 1) humiliated the parlia-
ment; 2) ruled with her back to the people, who expected from her leadership 
better days and a better life but received deception and systematic lies; and 
whose loyalty is not to the nation nor to Brazilian people but to her narrow-
minded ideology.
Additionally, other than the intention of a policy switch (Stokes, 2001; 
Reis, 2016), a reason for the coup seems to be stopping corruption investiga-
tions (Fernandes, 2016), as a famous leaked telephone statement from Senator 
and future Minister of Planning Romero Jucá shows: “It is necessary to change 
the government to stop this ‘bleeding’ [… in a great national agreement] with 
the Supreme Court and everything else.”. Traditional pro-coup parties such 
as PSDB and Temer’s Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) 
were also associated with corruption by voters, having a much worse electoral 
performance than the PT in 2018, as Figure 4 shows. The situation favored 
outsiders and back-benchers, such as far-right extremist Jair Bolsonaro (Reis 
& Soares, 2017), whose Social Liberal Party (PSL), tiny before his candidacy, 
became the second largest one in the lower house.1
There is a wave of political science best-sellers concerned about the demo-
cracy crisis in the world and the advancement of extremism, often presenting 
it as the death of democracy. Although agreeing with this general trend, I shall 
caution about core problems in the definition of the concept of democracy. 
Consequently, its autopsy is recurrently misdirected: while some democratic 
elements are perceived as risks, there are undemocratic ones that are presen-
ted as a remedy or as minor mischiefs.
Przeworski’s (2019) assumptions share Schumpeter’s idea that “the demo-
cratic method never works at its best when nations are much divided on fun-
damental questions of social structure” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 298). Indeed, 
Przeworski (2019, p. 20) considers that: “When political parties are highly 
ideological, when they believe that essential issues or values are at stake, they 
see their opponents as enemies who must be prevented from coming to office 
1  By the end of 2019, Jair Bolsonaro withdrew from PSL, having no party ever since. Only 




by any means.”. According to him (Przeworski, 2019, pp. 18–19), the stabi-
lity of democracy depended on a specific agreement: working-class parties 
accepted capitalism, unions moderated their demands, and “bourgeois parties 
and organizations accepted some redistribution of income”, with governments 
organizing that compromise. The difficulty for preserving that arrangement 
came from the loss of class roots and ideology by political parties, and from 
the fact that “unions lost much of their capacity to organize and discipline 
workers”. Those very changes would have as an effect higher income inequality 
with a reduced slice of the pie for workers. It would make voters susceptible to 
“populist” speech on the left as well as on the right.
Mainstream political science often shares that perception and expects that 
responsible governance lies in moderating demands and accepting that status 
quo, not “expecting too much from democracy”. Just like what happens among 
most of the old established political parties while holding office in Western 
Europe. According to that approach, changes should be the least dramatic 
possible, taking place only when they are almost consensual, in the Burkean 
way (Burke, 1790). However, all outsiders, either anti-neoliberal left-wing or 
far-right extremists, are equally labeled as “populists”. Any challenge to that 
political-economic consensus is viewed as radicalization and as a danger to 
democracy. Political science often follows the Schumpeterian idea that the va-
lue of democracy lies in stability and that no bond between popular preferen-
ces and implemented policies may be a serious concern.
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) consider as democratic, even quoting Madi-
son, a polity ruled by an establishment that makes all efforts to avoid any vo-
latility or renewal, by building entrance barriers. That establishment, groun-
ded in pre-existent political parties, is compromised with both endogenous 
tolerance and free-market policy. According to these authors, outsiders, either 
Source: Author (using data from G1, 08 October 2018).
Figure 4. 
Number of seats in Lower 
Chamber (selected parties)
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anti-neoliberal left-wing or far-right extremists (they mention a wide variety 
of politicians from different times and places), were expected to increasin-
gly use demagogic speech (which is, at once, anti-elite and authoritarian) and 
erode democracy from inside. Therefore, even hard means to take out those 
outsiders may be acceptable or at least understandable2:
[…] demagogue’s initial rise to power tends to polarize society, creating a cli-
mate of panic, hostility, and mutual distrust. The new leader’s threatening words 
often have a boomerang effect. […] the opposition may conclude that, for the 
good of the country, the government must be removed via extreme measures – 
impeachment, mass protest, even a coup. (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 76)
Legislatures may also overindulge their constitutional prerogatives. Take 
the 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay. Lugo, a lef-
tist ex-priest, was elected in 2008, ending the Colorado Party’s sixty-one-year 
run in power. An outsider with few friends in congress, Lugo faced impea-
chment attempts throughout his presidency. [...] According to one observer, 
the trial was an “obvious farce…. Lugo’s impeachment barely even rose to 
the level of show trial.” Strictly speaking, however, it was legal. (Levitsky & 
Ziblatt, 2018, p. 110)
Runciman (2018) is also concerned about “right and left populists” and 
so does he see a crisis in a modern democracy. Attacks on representative go-
vernment that are not led by militaries, but by businessmen and bankers, are 
viewed in a variety of ways throughout the book: as conspiratorial theories, 
as metaphors of coups, as disguised coups, or as distortions on democracy. 
Runciman emphasizes more the difficulty to undoubtedly identify a subtler 
coup than gives answers. In any event, he is also not very concerned about 
a connection between preferences and policies, in two main ways: 1) like Le-
vitsky and Ziblatt (2018), he does not see economic elites biasing outcomes 
as a major problem, and 2) similarly to Przeworski (2019), he considers that 
democracy is going to end just because of increasing popular demands for 
solutions (“supercharged solutionism”) and claims for personal recognition 
(“supercharged expressionism”), the very elements he pointed out as what 
makes democracy worth (respect and long-term benefits). According to him, 
they would be increasingly not possible together anymore.
2  Authors do say that those actions are “constitutional hardballs”, which violate “norms of 
toleration and restraint”, but the examples they use throughout the book show more indulgence 
towards establishment players than when it comes to outsiders. A good example is how they dis-
cuss George W. Bush’s role. They imply that his USA Patriot Act was “authoritarian”, or an “abuse 
of power” (p. 93) and they affirm that during his government there was a “decline in forbear-
ance”; however, they also say that only since Trump’s candidacy “the window was now also open 
to true outsiders” (p. 53). Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) many given examples of establishment 




The debates on democratic backsliding in world politics are often direc-
ted towards the issue of Executive aggrandizement. It is a historical concern 
in liberal and republican roots of political thought (Locke, Burke, Montes-
quieu, and Constant, for instance). The need for “horizontal accountability” 
(O’Donnell, 1998; Diamond & Morlino, 2005) has been expressed mainly be-
cause of this. Therefore, some variables on which literature focuses the most 
are media integrity, judicial independence, and effective parliament.
According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Indices, all 
three had been quite stable in Brazil since the enactment of the new Consti-
tution in 1988, until suffering a sharp decrease since the 2015 economic crisis 
(see Figure 5). However, the democratic breakdown in 2016 was caused by 
a cartel agreement between those very actors: the media, Judiciary and Par-
liament majority (Perissinotto, 2016; Reis, 2017; Santos, 2017; Chalhoub & 
Lima, 2018; Engelmann, 2018; Feres Júnior & Sassara, 2018; Marona & Barbo-
sa, 2018), backed by then-Vice President Michel Temer.
Source: GSoD Indices 2019.
There is a new and subtler kind of coup that is becoming more com-
mon in Latin America than old-style military ones (Coelho, 2016; Löwy, 
2016; Santos, 2017; Pereira da Silva, 2018). Those who control the Judiciary 
and do not suffer opposition from the Armed Forces, whether in the Exe-
cutive or not, may be able to oust the opposite side if there is no tolerance 
and the conflicts are not de facto regulated by institutionalized rules – like 
well- known distinctions between “antagonism” and “agonism”, and between 
“adversaries” and “enemies”, according to the concepts developed by Mouffe 
(2000, 2005). Protests both in favor of and against the coup happened, but 
violent police repression victimized those who tried to avoid a democratic 
breakdown.
Figure 5. 
Media Integrity, Judicial 
Independence, and Effective 
Parliament
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As a matter of fact, Rousseff had already enacted a criticized Anti-Terrorism 
Bill which could be used against activists, and indeed it became an obstacle to 
those who attempted to defend the president herself against the coup. Before 
“coupeachment” there was also a process of expansion of Military Justice res-
ponsibilities, with consequences such as lack of checks on law enforcement mis-
conduct by officers, particularly with the increasing use of the National Public 
Security Force in major police operations (Lessing, 2018; Del Río & Gomes, 
2018; Del Río & Rodrigues, 2018). This situation, however, would worsen with 
the new government, as will be explained in the following section.
Militarization
Quite unpopular, Temer assured his survival in office not only by bargaining 
with Parliament, the Judiciary, and businessmen but also through militari-
zation of his regime. Temer recreated the Cabinet for Institutional Security, 
to be led by General Sérgio Etchegoyen, a fierce critic of the National Truth 
Commission and a relative of key repressive agents of the previous military 
dictatorship (Reis, 2016). Temer also chose a military officer for Minister of 
Defense, which had not happened in Brazil since the end of Cardoso’s first 
term as president, in 1999 (Arias, 2018). However, the most radical decision 
by Temer towards militarization was perhaps the unprecedented authoriza-
tion of federal military intervention in public security in the state of Rio de 
Janeiro. In practice, this put the head of that operation above the state gover-
nor himself with regards to law enforcement, being different from the afore-
mentioned operations by the National Public Security Force (Lessing, 2018).
Before the presidential election, Presiding Supreme Court Judge Dias 
Toffoli invited General Fernando Azevedo e Silva, a member of the military 
close to Bolsonaro3, to be his personal advisor (Brigido & Sassine, 2018). 
Toffoli also said that the putsch of 1964 should not be called a coup, but a “mo-
vement”, adding that people “chose to blame the military” but the left was also 
responsible for that situation. Bolsonaro began his political career after reti-
ring as a military officer and always defended not only conservative views but 
also narrow military interests, including refusing any criticism or punishment 
for the military dictatorship.
As a presidential candidate, Bolsonaro chose General Hamilton Mourão 
to be his vice president. A strong supporter of Bolsonaro’s candidacy, General 
Augusto Heleno Pereira has been chosen to be one of his closest advisors, as 
the head of the Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete de Segurança Ins-
titucional, GSI). Additionally, Bolsonaro appointed members of the military 
3  Eventually, Azevedo was appointed as minister of Defense by Bolsonaro. However, their 
relationship worsened due to disagreements concerning pandemic and, in March 2021, he was 




for an unparalleled number of offices and the management of the largest slice 
of budgetary pie since the end of military dictatorship. That includes state-
owned firms and many positions in the cabinet, including Civil House (chief 
of staff) and even Health during COVID-19 pandemic (Vianna, 2021).
In a public demonstration of authoritarian far-right agenda, GSI head 
General Heleno informed that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency was spying 
on Brazilian cardinals because of the meetings with Pope Francis about the 
Synod of Bishops for the Pan-Amazon region. According to him, those were 
“alarming” meetings towards a “progressive agenda” and opposition to the go-
vernment which needed to be “neutralized”. By “progressive agenda” he meant 
the discussion on climatic changes and the lives of indigenous peoples and 
quilombolas (traditional black communities that descend from former slaves). 
More recently, referring to an investigation on charges against Bolsonaro, He-
leno said that “it is inconceivable and even unbelievable”, and then threate-
ned by stating that “it may lead to unpredictable consequences to national 
stability”.
Not only an authoritarian and violent faction of the Armed Forces is im-
portant inside Bolsonaro’s government, but also there are clues of connections 
with mafia-like paramilitary groups called “militias” (Paiva & Do Sul, 2019; 
Calixto, 2019).4 Following Bolsonaro’s path, there was also an increase in the 
number of military candidates and voting winners in the elections for many 
offices.
According to Cheibub (2006, p. 18), “the military, once activated into po-
litics, are hard to control”, and that is the reason why authoritarian legacies 
may lead to shorter-life democracies, particularly if they follow military dic-
tatorships. Indeed, as General Eduardo Villas Bôas admitted, the Army High 
Command planned together a message published by him on Twitter inducing 
the Supreme Court to deny Lula’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Together 
with other stages of Lula’s judicial process, it biased presidential elections, an 
issue I will address in the following section.
Undemocratic election
Far-right personalistic extremism represented by new president Bolsonaro has 
been boosted by the undemocratic disruptive behavior of institutions that are 
supposed to put checks on government. Therefore, more attention should be 
directed to the private media and the Judiciary, not to be taken for granted as 
neutral actors.
Favorite to win the 2018 presidential election, former president Lula has 
been condemned and lost his political rights in a politicized judicial process 
(Weisbrot, 2018; Marona & Barbosa, 2018) in which his constitutional right to 
4  In order to read more about how militias work, see Phillips (2018) and Manso (2020).
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due process was disrespected. Plea bargaining (delação premiada) “Snitching 
Rewards” were adopted in Brazil in a biased way, disrespecting due process 
and transferring the burden of proof to the accused (Avritzer, 2018). Sérgio 
Moro, the same judge who condemned Lula with no material evidence to pro-
ve the corruption charges against him in the Car Wash Operation in a lawfa-
re case (National Coordination of the Homeless Workers Movement, 2018; 
Marona & Barbosa, 2018), was rewarded by being chosen as the Minister of 
Justice and Public Security by then president-elect Bolsonaro.5
Public prosecutors involved in the Car Wash Operation and judge Moro 
schemed together in order to have support in the media and to impact elec-
tions, concerned about not allowing PT’s success. It became clear when some 
private chats between them in the Telegram application were leaked (Duarte, 
2020; Estrada, 2021). Brazilian Public Prosecution, following Thatcher and 
Sweet’s (2003) discussion on delegation, is a non-majoritarian institution, that 
is, it is not accountable to people’s democratic vote. Considering the authors’ 
model, it is a non-majoritarian institution with a broad and eventually enlar-
ged ex-ante agency and exposed to very little ex-post control, enjoying a subs-
tantial “zone of discretion”. Therefore, we ought to acknowledge that its mi-
suse of power is no less harmful to democracy than the issue of Executive 
aggrandizement.
Lula led all the polls, and his interdiction predictably changed the election 
result (see Figure 6). Although the PT’s alternative for the presidential race, 
Fernando Haddad, grew in the polls and reached the runoff, he was far from 
Lula as a favorite against Bolsonaro, who was already in the lead in the polls 
when Lula’s candidacy was not considered as an option. Then, a biased judicial 
process determined the result of the 2018 Brazilian presidential election (Lon-
doño & Casado, 2019), which must not be considered fair.
However, other serious problems also happened in this electoral process. 
Bolsonaro, in both his 28-year career as Congressman and in his presidential 
campaign, manifested intolerance against the left, support for the violation of 
human rights and the military dictatorship, and offended minorities and vul-
nerable groups, such as women, blacks, indigenous peoples, and homosexuals 
(Forrest, 2018). While running for president, he stated that PT politicians and 
supporters should be shot by a firing squad and that they would be sent to 
Ponta da Praia, an execution site during the military dictatorship. Unsurpri-
singly, widespread violence accompanied his campaign, at levels unparalleled 
with previous national elections. Bolsonaro himself has been stabbed, in not 
yet fully known circumstances.
Besides his hate speech, some illegal elements may have helped in 
Bolsonaro’s triumph. The extremist contender’s businessmen supporters alle-
gedly paid for sending voters massive fake news against PT candidate Fernan-
5  It was such a powerful new Ministry, controlling most of the law enforcement institutions, 




do Haddad through the messaging application WhatsApp (Tardáguila et al., 
2018). If these accusations are true, different kinds of electoral crimes have 
been committed: 1) electoral financing by firms is illegal in Brazil; 2) sprea-
ding fake news is obviously not permitted; 3) paying for flooding messages in 
WhatsApp during political campaigns is not allowed either.
Conclusion
As discussed in the present text, literature on democracy backsliding is often 
misleading. Executive aggrandizement or direct military intervention are of-
ten seen as the main (or unique) causes of democratic breakdown. Though, 
there are other monsters besides Leviathan killing democracy. Institutions 
responsible for checking may wreck democratic order in an “antagonist” way 
(contrary to an “agonic” behavior), such as the Judiciary. While searching 
for “populists”, political science may neglect subtler coups and undemocratic 
schemes caused by the establishment.
Indeed, the very presidents accountable for the deepening of check ins-
truments on Executive in Brazil were punished by them. Rousseff suffered 
a “coupeachment”, and Lula became a political prisoner, unable to run in the 
election in which he led the polls. Besides the intended policy switch to the 
right, other side effects may be noticed in Brazilian politics since democra-
cy ceased to be a commitment, returning to its undemocratic chain. First of 
all, the party system has been harmed, and the main parties that opposed PT 
shrank while backbenchers became more influential. Secondly, militarization 
grew both inside the government and on elections, what may lead to a rougher 
Source: Datafolha and Ibope presidential polls – 12 April 2016–18 September 2018.
Figure 6. 
Presidential polls – 12 April 
2016–18 September 2018
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democratic breakdown in a near future if they behave as veto players or simply 
do not accept to leave. Thirdly, Brazilian society is not only divided, but vio-
lent values became more mainstream and openly sustained. As elections are 
no more the only game in town, and when they happen, there is no ex-post 
irreversibility, polity also became less predictable, with a broader range of va-
riables to impact.
The Car Wash Operation ended in February 2021. In March, the Supre-
me Court cancelled Lula’s conviction and also considered former judge Sergio 
Moro as suspect of bias. Lula became eligible again. Perhaps the road back to 
democracy began to be traveled. Alternatively, maybe the road is still too long, 
and militaries will be blocking the passage.
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